
**Information technology — Security
techniques — Key management —**

**Part 4:
Mechanisms based on weak secrets**

*Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Gestion
de clés —*

Partie 4: Mécanismes basés sur des secrets faibles





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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

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For an explanation on the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.

This document was prepared by ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, SC 27, *IT Security techniques*.

This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/IEC 11770-4:2006), which has been technically revised. It also incorporates the Technical Corrigendum ISO/IEC 11770-4:2006/Cor1:2009.

This edition includes the following significant changes with respect to the previous edition:

- revision of the Balanced Key Agreement Mechanism 1 (BKAM1) to address the attacks reported in Reference [6];
- addition of a new Balanced Key Agreement Mechanism 2 (BKAM2) based on the J-PAKE scheme of Reference [5];
- addition of a new Augmented Key Agreement Mechanism 3 (AKAM3) based on the AugPAKE scheme of Reference [23].

A list of all parts in the ISO/IEC 11770 series can be found on the ISO website.

Introduction

The mechanisms specified in this document are designed to achieve one of the following three goals.

- a) **Balanced password-authenticated key agreement:** Establish one or more shared secret keys between two entities that share a common weak secret. In a balanced password-authenticated key agreement mechanism, the shared secret keys are the result of a data exchange between the two entities; the shared secret keys are established if, and only if, the two entities have used the same weak secret; and neither of the two entities can predetermine the values of the shared secret keys.
- b) **Augmented password-authenticated key agreement:** Establish one or more shared secret keys between two entities *A* and *B*, where *A* has a weak secret and *B* has verification data derived from a one-way function of *A*'s weak secret. In an augmented password-authenticated key agreement mechanism, the shared secret keys are the result of a data exchange between the two entities; the shared secret keys are established if, and only if, the two entities have used the weak secret and the corresponding verification data; and neither of the two entities can predetermine the values of the shared secret keys.

NOTE 1 This type of key agreement mechanism is unable to protect *A*'s weak secret being discovered by *B*, but only increases the cost for an adversary to get *A*'s weak secret from *B*. A typical application scenario would involve use between a client (*A*) and a server (*B*).

- c) **Password-authenticated key retrieval:** Establish one or more secret keys for an entity, *A*, associated with another entity, *B*, where *A* has a weak secret and *B* has a strong secret associated with *A*'s weak secret. In an authenticated key retrieval mechanism, the secret keys, retrievable by *A* (not necessarily derivable by *B*), are the result of a data exchange between the two entities, and the secret keys are established if, and only if, the two entities have used the weak secret and the associated strong secret. However, although *B*'s strong secret is associated with *A*'s weak secret, the strong secret does not (in itself) contain sufficient information to permit either the weak secret or the secret keys established in the mechanism to be determined.

NOTE 2 This type of key retrieval mechanism is used in those applications where *A* does not have secure storage for a strong secret, and requires *B*'s assistance to retrieve the strong secret. Such a mechanism is appropriate for use between a client (*A*) and a server (*B*).

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Information technology — Security techniques — Key management —

Part 4: Mechanisms based on weak secrets

1 Scope

This document defines key establishment mechanisms based on weak secrets, i.e. secrets that can be readily memorized by a human, and hence, secrets that will be chosen from a relatively small set of possibilities. It specifies cryptographic techniques specifically designed to establish one or more secret keys based on a weak secret derived from a memorized password, while preventing offline brute-force attacks associated with the weak secret. This document is not applicable to the following aspects of key management:

- life-cycle management of weak secrets, strong secrets, and established secret keys;
- mechanisms to store, archive, delete, destroy, etc. weak secrets, strong secrets, and established secret keys.

2 Normative reference

There are no normative references in this document.