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**Universal serial bus interfaces for data and power –
Part 1-4: Common components – USB Type-C™ Authentication Specification**

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UNIVERSAL SERIAL BUS INTERFACES FOR DATA AND POWER –

Part 1-4: Common components – USB Type-C™ Authentication Specification

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The text of this standard was prepared by the USB Implementers Forum (USB-IF). The structure and editorial rules used in this publication reflect the practice of the organization which submitted it.

This bilingual version (2019-01) corresponds to the English version, published in 2018-04.

The text of this International Standard is based on the following documents:

CDV	Report on voting
100/2981/CDV	100/3046/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this International Standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

The French version of this standard has not been voted upon.

A list of all parts in the IEC 62680 series, published under the general title *Universal serial bus interfaces for data and power*, can be found on the IEC website.

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The IEC 62680 series is based on a series of specifications that were originally developed by the USB Implementers Forum (USB-IF). These specifications were submitted to the IEC under the auspices of a special agreement between the IEC and the USB-IF.

This standard is the USB-IF publication USB Type-C™ Authentication Specification Revision 1.0.

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Universal Serial Bus Type-C™ Authentication Specification

Revision 1.0 with ECN and Errata through February 2, 2017

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Revision History

Revision	Date	Description
1.0	March 25, 2016	Initial Release
1.0 + ECN and Errata	February 2, 2017	Includes ECN and errata through February 2, 2017

1 Introduction

This specification provides a means for authenticating Products with regard to identification and configuration. Authentication is performed via USB Power Delivery message communications and/or via USB data bus control transactions.

USB Type-C™ Authentication allows an organization to set and enforce a Policy with regard to acceptable Products. This will permit useful security assurances in real world situations. For example:

- A vendor, concerned about product damage resulting from substandard charging devices, can set a Policy requiring that only certified PD Products be used for charging.
- A user, concerned about charging his phone at a public terminal, can set a Policy in his phone requiring that the phone only charge from certified PD Products.
- An organization, concerned about unidentifiable storage devices gaining access to corporate PC assets, can set a Policy in its PCs requiring that only USB storage devices that have been verified and signed by corporate IT are used.

1.1 Scope

This specification defines the architecture and methodology for unilateral Product Authentication. It is intended to be fully compatible with and extend existing PD and USB infrastructure. Information is provided to allow for Policy enforcement, but individual Policy decisions are not specified.

The Authentication of USB Type-C products that support Alternate Modes is allowed. However, the methods to do so are outside the scope of this specification.

1.2 Overview

This specification provides primitives for unilateral Authentication. The security model defined by this specification permits assurances that a Product is:

- Of a particular type from a particular manufacturer with particular characteristics
- Owned and controlled by a particular organization

Local Policy will determine which features need to be present in an attached Product before accessing or providing a resource (e.g. power, storage, etc.).

Product vendors can add security features beyond those listed in this specification, but the definition and implementation of those features is up to the vendor. Added features cannot alter the base specifications defined herein.

1.3 Related Documents

- **USB2.0** – Universal Serial Bus Specification, Revision 2.0, (including errata and ECNs through August 11, 2014) (referred to in this document as the USB 2.0 Specification) (available at: <http://www.usb.org/developers/docs>.)
- **USB3.1** – Universal Serial Bus 3.1 Specification, Revision 1.0, (including errata and ECNs through August 11, 2014) (referred to in this document as the USB 3.1 Specification) (available at: <http://www.usb.org/developers/docs>.)
- **USBPD** – Universal Serial Bus Power Delivery Specification, Revision 3, Version 1.0a, March 25, 2016 (referred to in this document as the USB PD Specification) (available at: <http://www.usb.org/developers/docs>.)
- **USBTYP EC** –Universal Serial Bus Type-C Cable and Connector Specification, Revision 1.2, March 25, 2016 (referred to in this document as the USB Type-C Specification)(available at: <http://www.usb.org/developers/docs>.)
- **USBTYP EC BRIDGE** Universal Serial Bus Type-C Bridge Specification, Revision 1.0, March 25, 2016, (available at <http://www.usb.org/developers/docs>.)
- **ASN.1** - ISO-822-1-4:
 - ITU-T X.680 (available at:
https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.680-201508-111PDF-E&type=items);
 - ITU-T X.681 (available at:
https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.681-201508-111PDF-E&type=items);
 - ITU-T X.682 (Available at:
https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.682-201508-111PDF-E&type=items);
 - ITU-T X.683 (Available at:
https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.683-201508-111PDF-E&type=items.)
- **DER** - ISO-8825-1; ITU-T X.690 (available at:
https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.690-201508-111PDF-E&type=items.)
- **X509v3** - ISO-9594-8; ITU-T X.509 (available at:
https://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.509-201210-111PDF-E&type=items.)
- **Common Criteria:**
 - Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts 1-3, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2010 (available at:
<https://www.commoncriteriaproject.org/cc/#supporting>)
 - ISO/IEC 15408 Evaluation criteria for IT security Parts 1-3
- **ECDSA:**
 - ANSI X9.62; NIST-FIPS-186-4, Section 6 (available at:
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.)
 - ISO/IEC 14888-3 Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms (Clause 6.6)
- **NIST P256, secp256r1:**
 - Certicom-SEC-2 (available at: <http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>); NIST-Recommended-EC (available at:
<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/dss/NISTReCur.pdf>.)

- ISO/IEC 15946 Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves (NIST P-256 is included as example)
 - *Notes: ISO/IEC 15946 series treat elliptic curves differently from FIPS 186-4. ISO/IEC 15946-5 is about elliptic curve generation. That is, based on the method in part 5, each application and implementation can generate its own curves to use. In other words, no ISO/IEC recommended curves. P-256 is considered an example in ISO/IEC 15946. Note that Elliptic Curve signatures and key establishment schemes have been moved to ISO/IEC 14888 and ISO/IEC 11770 respectively together with other discrete log based mechanisms. Test vectors (examples) using P-256 are included for each parts for those mechanisms.*
- **SHA256:**
 - NIST-FIPS-180-4 (available at:
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.)
 - ISO/IEC 10118-3 Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions (Clause 10)
- **OID** - ITU-T X.402 (available at: <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.402-199906-I/en>.)
- **SP800-90A:**
 - NIST-SP-800-90A (available at:
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf>.)
 - *Note: NIST-SP-800-90A was withdrawn June 2015 and replaced by NIST-SP-800-90A Revision 1
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>*
- **SP800-90B** – NIST-SP-800-90B (available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-90/sp800-90b_second_draft.pdf)¹

¹ Note that this document is still in DRAFT phase.

² Unless specified otherwise, all standards specified, including those from ISO, ITU, and NIST, refer to the version or edition which is more recent, as of 1 January 2016.